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Comment
Sealing and Expungement of
Criminal Records: Avoiding the
Inevitable Social Stigma
Big government, the expanding use of computers, and the constant prob-
ing into our lives by countless organizations make us a highly scutinized,
watched, counted, recorded and questioned people.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past several years there has been a growing concern over
the kind of information that is collected and disseminated about an
individual.2 In an ever increasingly computerized society, one be-
comes curious about the information "Big Brother" has stored
about us.3 Of this tremendous amount of information collected,
1. Miller, Our Right of Privacy Needs Protection from the Press, 7 HumAN RiGHTS
16, 18 (Spring 1978).
2. One reason for the concern is that "the federal government today maintains
6,723 different record systems containing a total of 3.9 billion individual files,
or eighteen files for every man, woman and child in the United States!"
Caine, Computers and the Right to Be Let Alone-A Civil Libertarian View,
22 VmL. L. REv. 1181, 1183 (1977).
3. One commentator has related the following incident:
Recently, a group of police officers were touring a police records de-
partment. After hearing an explanation of how data could be ob-
tained from the computer by the mere entry of a person's name, one
officer requested that his name be entered so he could see the sys-
tem operate. Although it was suggested that such a demonstration
would be pointless because the officer would have no record, the re-
quest was complied with. To everyone's surprise, particularly the of-
ficer who had made the request, the computer responded that the
person had once been suspected of being a "peeping tom." Under-
standably upset, the officer immediately commenced an investiga-
tion to discover why this entry was on his record. He eventually
learned the explanation. At one time a woman living in an apartment
complex reported a peeping tom, and as a matter of course the
names of all the male residents of the apartment complex were put
on a list of "suspects." The officer, since he resided in the apartment
complex at the time, was included in this list. He was never con-
tacted, questioned or even aware of being a suspect. Nevertheless
this information became part of his computer record.
Comment, The Rights of the Innocent Arrestee: Sealing of Records Under Cal-
ifornia Penal Code Section 851.8, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 1463, 1465 n.15 (1977).
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there is probably none that poses such potential for abuse and
misuse as well as a threat to an individual's privacy and reputation
as does the collection of arrest and conviction records.4
It has been estimated that about forty percent of the male chil-
dren living in the United States today will at some time be arrested
for a non-traffic offense. 5 Additionally, the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI) has amassed some 200 million sets of finger-
prints. 6 Thus, it is quite likely that an individual might have been
involved in an activity which would have generated "a record at
almost every level of the criminal justice system-from the police
department, through the courts, to the FBI.' ' 7 Of course, genera-
tion of the record in and of itself does not pose a tremendous prob-
lem. 8 But the presentation of the record and disclosure of its
contents to others have caused much concern about the dangers of
inaccurate or incomplete records, dissemination outside the crimi-
nal justice system, and reliance on such records as a basis for de-
nying business or professional licensing, employment, or other
opportunities for personal advancement. 9 To afford protection to
4. Throughout this comment the term "criminal record" will be used to refer to
both arrest and conviction records. "Conviction record" will be used when
the arrest resulted in a conviction and if the arrestee was exonerated the in-
formation will be referred to as an "arrest record."
5. Comment, Expungement and Sealing of Arrest and Conviction Records: The
New Jersey Response, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 864, 868 (1974) (citing THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 247 (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME]). See also note 40 infra.
6. Comment, supra note 5, at 874 n.48.
7. Comment, The Press and Criminal Record Privacy, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 509, 511
(1976) (footnote omitted).
8. Comment, supra note 5, at 868 n.22.
9. See, e.g., Hess & Le Poole, Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Con-
viction, 13 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 494, 495-98 (1967); Karabian, Record of Ar-
rest: The Indelible Stain, 3 PAC. L.J. 20, 21-24 (1972); Schiavo, Condemned by
the Record, 55 A.B.A.J. 540, 541-42 (1969); Steele, A Suggested Legislative De-
vice for Dealing with Abuses of Criminal Records, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 32, 38-
42 (1972); Comment, The Arrest Record and New York City Public Hiring: An
Evaluation, 9 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PRoB. 442, 445-48 (1973); Comment, Arrest
Records-Protecting the Innocent, 48 TUL. L. REV. 629, 634-36 (1974); Com-
ment, Arrest Records as a Racially Discriminatory Employment Criterion, 6
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 168-71 (1970); Comment, Guilt by Record, 1 CAL.
W. L. REV. 126, 126-29 (1965); Comment, Maintenance and Dissemination of
Criminal Records: A Legislative Proposal, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 654, 664-65
(1972); Comment, Removing the Stigma of Arrest: The Courts, The Legisla-
tures and Unconvicted Arrestees, 47 WASH. L. REV. 659, 660-62 (1972); Com-
ment, Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38
U. CHI. L. REV. 850, 853 (1971); Note, A Constitutional Right to the Return of
Fingerprints and Photographs on Acquittal, 37 Mo. L. REV. 709, 713-14 (1972);
Note, Discrimination on the Basis of Arrest Records, 56 CORNELL L REV. 470,
470-75 (1971); Note, The Dissemination of Arrest Records in the Iowa TRACIS
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individuals with arrest or conviction records the principal develop-
ment 0 has been providing for expungement or sealing" of such
records.
This comment will explore the problems which expungement
and sealing are aimed at solving,'2 examine the judicial response
to the problem, and describe different approaches certain state leg-
islatures have adopted. The arguments for and against retention
of criminal records will be discussed and the need for some type of
legislative response in Nebraska will be suggested.
II. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM
Suppose you are waiting in a park late at night for a friend to
pick you up and the police erroneously charge you on a suspicion
of being a prowler in the neighborhood.'3 Or suppose you've taken
a cab home and only have a twenty dollar bill with which to pay
Bill, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1162, 1163-66 (1974); 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 825, 830 (1971).
See generally Alexander & Walz, Arrest Record Expungement in California:
The Polishing of Sterling, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 299 (1974); Baum, Wiping Out a
Criminal or Juvenile Record, 40 STATE BAR J. 816 (1965); Booth, The Expunge-
ment Myth, 38 L.A. BAR BULL. 161 (1963); Kogon & Doughery, Sealing and
Expungement of Criminal Records-The Big Lie, 61 J. CIM. L. C. & P. S. 378
(1970); Comment, Criminal Records of Arrest and Conviction: Expungement
From the General Public Access, 3 CAL. W. L. REv. 121 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Expungement from the General Public]; Note, Constitutional Law-
Maintenance and Dissemination of Records of Arrest Versus The Right to Pri-
vacy, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 995 (1971); 8 Loy. L. A. L. REV. 238 (1975).
10. Relief was historically provided by the king as an act of grace and by execu-
tive pardon procedures. Comment, supra note 5, at 865. More recently, some
jurisdictions have provided relief through automatic restoration statutes.
Special Project-The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23
VAND. L. REV. 929, 1143 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Collateral Consequences].
11. Various jurisdictions define expungement and sealing differently and some
use the terms interchangeably. In general, sealing does not purport to de-
stroy the record, whereas expungement connotes physical destruction.
When a record or proceeding is expunged it is as though the event giving rise
to the record had never happened in the first place. Sealing statutes usually
provide "that all government records relating to an offender's criminal record
are closed to public inspection." Collateral Consequences, supra note 10, at
1149 n.627. See also BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 693 (4th ed. 1968) which defines
"expunge" as "to destroy or obliterate; it implies not a legal act, but a physi-
cal annihilation."
The correct noun form for the act of expunging is "expunction." See WEB-
STER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 803 (2d ed. 1934). But the courts, legislators and
commentators almost uniformly use the word expungement and this com-
ment will also follow that form.
12. This comment will not deal with the expungement of juvenile records, but an
excellent discussion of the area can be found in Gough, The Expungement of
Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status,
1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 147.
13. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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the driver. He has no change and puts you under citizen's arrest
for refusing to pay his fare. 14 In both situations the charges were
dropped but a criminal record arose out of both incidents. Severe
disabilities could result from disclosure of these arrest records
even though the arrests did not result in convictions. The problem
is that only lip service is given to the presumption that a person is
innocent until proven guilty. Furthermore, when a conviction does
occur and the individual has served time and paid a fine, then is it
not true that the offender has "paid his debt to society"? In re-
sponse, one commentator has observed that though payment is
tendered, the individual "'neither receives a receipt nor is free of
his account.' ",15 Apparently the prominent belief is that "an arrest
is tantamount to guilt"' 6 and once found guilty the individual is
stigmatized indefinitely, resulting in a "record prison"' 7 in which
people are incarcerated by their criminal history records.' 8
A. The "Record Prison"
There are numerous ways a past criminal record may be used
within the criminal justice system. The record may be used as an
investigative tool by the police, to solve similar crimes or obtain
further evidence. 19 Reasonable or probable cause for making an
arrest might arise when the modus operandi of a crime is similar
to that described in a suspect's record.20 Thus, a person with an
arrest record is more likely to become a suspect in police investiga-
tions. One court has stated that "it is common knowledge that a
man with an arrest record is much more apt to be subject to police
scrutiny-the first to be questioned and the last eliminated as a
suspect in an investigation." 2 1
14. Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962). See
also Alexander & Walz, supra note 9.
15. Gough, supra note 12, at 148 (quoting Tappan, Loss and Restoration of the
Civil Rights of Offenders, 1952 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE A. Y.B. 86, 87).
16. Comment, supra note 7, at 512. See also Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417
F.2d 728, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Comment, Discriminatory Hiring Practices Due
to Arrest Records-Private Remedies, 17 VILL. L. REV. 110, 112-13 (1971); Note,
The Dissemination of Arrest Records and the Iowa TRACIS Bill, 59 IowA L.
REV. 1162, 1167 (1974); 41 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 106 (1972).
17. The concept is explained in greater detail in DeWeese, Reforming Our "Rec-
ord Prisons'" A Proposalfor the Federal Regulation of Crime Data Banks, 6
RUT.-CAm. L. J. 26, 48 (1974).
18. Comment, supra note 7, at 513.
19. Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 865, 553 P.2d 624, 628, 132 Cal. Rptr.
464, 468 (1976).
20. Comment, supra note 5, at 866. See also A. NEIER, DossIER ch. 10 (1975); De-
Weese, supra note 17.
21. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 127, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (1972).
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An example of the problem is illustrated by White v. State,22
where a person with a record of one prior arrest was identified
from a "mug shot" as a suspect in a check forgery case. The prose-
cutor subsequently decided not to prosecute because White was
not in the state and only a small amount of money was involved.
However, because of the arrest record White was denied employ-
ment as a police officer and was not successful at obtaining other
jobs. White sued the state for libel and negligence but a judgment
of nonsuit was entered.23 The court reasoned that the state was
protected from tort liability by a conditional privilege.24 It seems
clear, then, that those with a previous record stand an extremely
good chance of being rearrested some time in their lives. Such a
practice imposes a tremendous "undeserved handicap [especially]
for an innocent arrestee. '2 5
The prior record can be used for a variety of other purposes at
other stages of the criminal process as well. Prior records are
often taken into account in deciding whether an offense should be
charged, whether a felony or misdemeanor should be prosecuted
and whether a plea bargain should be accepted.26 Once a person
22. 17 Cal. App. 3d 621, 95 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1971).
23. Id. at 630, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
24. The dissent argued that the individual's interests were not being sufficiently
protected:
Our nation's current social developments harbor insidious evolu-
tionary forces which propel us toward a collective, Orwellian society.
One of the features of that society is the utter destruction of privacy,
the individual's complete exposure to the all-seeing, all-powerful po-
lice state. Government agencies, civilian and military, federal, state
and local, have acquired miles and acres of files, enclosing revela-
tions of the personal affairs and conditions of millions of private indi-
viduals. Credit agencies and other business enterprises assemble
similar collections. Information peddlers burrow into the crannies of
these collections. Microfilm and electronic tape facilitate the storage
of private facts on an enormous scale. Computers permit automated
retrieval, assemblage and dissemination. These vast repositories of
personal information may easily be assembled into millions of dos-
siers characteristic of a police state. Our age is one of shriveled pri-
vacy. Leaky statutes imperfectly guard a small portion of these
monumental revelations. Appellate courts should think twice,
should locate a balance between public need and private rights,
before deciding that custodians of sensitive personal files may with
impunity refuse to investigate claims of mistaken identity or other
error which threaten the subject with undeserved loss. The office of
judges is to strike that balance rather than pursue sentiments of in-
dignation or sympathy. It is obvious, nevertheless, that an unwar-
ranted record of conviction, even of arrest, may ruin an individual's
reputation, his livelihood, even his life.
Id. at 631, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82 (Friedman, J., dissenting in part, concurring
in part) (footnotes omitted).
25. Comment, supra note 3, at 1467.
26. DeWeese, supra note 17, at 82.
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has been charged, a prior record may be used to decide the ques-
tion of pretrial release. Prior arrests and their dispositions will be
considered by the court in determining whether the defendant
should be released on recognizance or, if not, the amount of bail
that should be fixed.27 After trial and upon conviction, probation
and parole authorities may use the arrest record in determining
whether and upon what conditions to grant probation or when to
release a defendant on parole.28
Not only does a prior record act to "imprison" an individual in a
"recokd prison" within the criminal justice system, but it has simi-
lar effects without. For.example, licensing boards consider a prior
record in deciding whether to revoke or deny a license. 29 Because
of the widespread dissemination of these records,30 applicants may
have difficulty in obtaining insurance, credit 3 ' or admission to cer-
tain schools.32
B. "Above all else, employers are leery of any job applicant who has
ever been arrested. Not necessarily convicted of a crime-just
arrested." 33
Disclosure of criminal records may have an overwhelming im-
pact on one's ability to seek and hold "gainful" employment.34 A
27. Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d at 867-68, 533 P.2d at 630, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
470 (1976).
28. Id.
29. Most statutes require that applicants be of "good moral character." Com-
ment, supra note 5, at 867 n.16. For other licensing restrictions placed upon
ex-offenders, see J. HuNT, J. BOWERS & N. MILLER, LAWS, LICENSES AND THE
OFFENDER'S RIGHT TO WORK (ABA Comm'n on Correctional Facilities and
Services) (1973).
30. One study in the District of Columbia revealed that more than 3,500 criminal
arrest records were disseminated weekly to private employers. See Morrow
v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citing COMMITrEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE EFFECTS OF POLICE ARREST RECORDS ON EMPLOYMENT IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 9 (1967) [also referred to as the Duncan Re-
port]). The Duncan Report also found that in other major cities there was a
similar practice of giving influential employers access to police records.
31. V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY 54 (1964); Note, Arrest and Credit Records:
Can the Right of Privacy Survive?, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 681 (1972). But see Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (5) (1976) which prohibits the re-
porting of arrest or conviction information seven years or older.
32. See, e.g., State v. Campobasso, 125 N.J. Super. 103, 308 A.2d 674 (1973) (peti-
tioner removed from trade school until conviction, for being under the influ-
ence of a controlled substance, was expunged).
33. Hayden, How Much Does the Boss Need to Know?, 3 Cirv. LiB. REV. 23, 30
(Aug./Sept. 1976).
34. The enormous influence dissemination of arrest records has on a person's job
opportunities is documented in Hess & Le Poole, supra note 9; Karst, "The
Files'". Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Per-
sonal Data, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 367 (1966); Collateral Conse-
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survey of New York City employment agencies indicated that
about seventy-five percent ask applicants if they have an arrest
record and generally do not refer those applicants who do, though
the arrest may not have led to a conviction.35 If two or more appli-
cants apply for the same job, those with previous arrest records
"clearly stand in a less favorable position than do other appli-
cants. ' 36 Employers often state as their reason for not hiring an
individual with a record is that their bond contract with the surety
company is voided if they hire individuals with an arrest record
without the surety company's prior consent.37
To a limited extent, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 38 may afford
some relief. In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.,3 9 the plaintiff was
denied employment because of a record of fourteen arrests, though
not one of them lead to a conviction. It was contended that be-
cause blacks are more prone to be arrested than whites,40 Litton's
practice of refusing employment on the basis of arrest records ren-
dered its policy racially discriminatory.41 The court agreed and en-
joined the company from such practice, noting that there was no
evidence to support the contention that an employee with several
arrests, but no convictions,42 is less likely to be honest or reliable
quences, supra note 10, at 1001-18. See also Morrow v. District of Columbia,
417 F.2d 728, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
35. Comment, Removing the Stigma of Arrest: The Courts, the Legislatures and
Unconvicted Arrestees, 47 WASH. L. REV. 659, 660 (1972) (citing THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME, supra note 5, at 75); See also note 30 supra.
36. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. at 127, 503 P.2d at 159 and n.3.
37. Gough, supra note 12, at 158; Comment, The Expungement or Restriction of
Arrest Records, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 123, 124 (1974).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
39. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified on other grounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th
Cir. 1972).
40. One commentator has concluded that:
[t] he probability of arrest for urban males is quite high. For urban
black males the probability of arrest at least once during a lifetime
has been estimated to be as high as 90%. For white urban males the
figure is 60%, and for all males it is 47%. Fewer than 25% of those
arrested per year are found guilty of the offense for which they were
arrested, and only a little more than 25% are found guilty of any
crime at all. As the statistics show, the punishment which flows from
an arrest record works a disproportionate disadvantage against
blacks in the ghettos in cities throughout the United States.
Caine, supra note 2, at 1189 (citing PRESmENr's COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCE-
MENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, at 216 (App. J) (1967)); CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE UNIFORM CRIME REP. 103, table 17 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
41. 316 F. Supp. at 403.
42. For a discussion of the problem as it relates to conviction records, see Green
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Note, Employment Discrim-
ination-Title VII-Unlawful to Use Conviction Records as an Absolute Bar
to Employment, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1251 (1976).
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than one without such a record.43 Although the case gives some
hope to black applicants bringing actions under Title VII, it would
be difficult for a white applicant to gain similar relief."
C. Admission to the Bar
Professional licensing statutes often require that applicants be
of "good moral character" or have not committed "crimes involving
moral turpitude. '45 This requirement has been generally accepted
as a permissible prerequisite for admission to the bar.46 It has also
been held that a criminal record may reflect upon an applicant's
moral character.47
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners48 the Supreme Court
reversed a decision to exclude an applicant from the practice of
law for want of "good moral character. ' 49 The court asserted that a
state may require high standards of qualification before it admits
an applicant to the bar but the qualification must have a rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law.50 Although the court did not hold that it was impermissible to
consider prior arrests, it did explain what significance such a rec-
ord should have: "The mere fact that a man has been arrested has
very little, if any, probative value in showing that he engaged in
any misconduct. An arrest shows nothing more than that someone
probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense."5 1
D. Mass Arrests
In some jurisdictions there have been mass arrests of unpopu-
lar groups, sometimes for the purpose of harassment.5 2 For exam-
43. 316 F. Supp. at 402.
44. But see Comment, Arrest Records as a Racially Discriminatory Employment
Criterion, 6 HARv. Civ. LIB. L. REV. 165 (1970). The commentator argues that
since Title VII also prohibits sex discrimination and because males are ar-
rested more often than females, denying males employment because of nu-
merous arrests would also be prohibited.
45. See note 29 & accompanying text supra.
46. See Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 192 (1978).
47. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
48. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
49. The applicant had been a member of the Communist Party from 1932 to 1940;
he had used aliases to avoid job discrimination. He was arrested while partic-
ipating in a strike in 1934 but was later released, and was arrested in 1940 on a
charge of violating the Federal Neutrality Act, but was again released. The
finding of bad moral character was held to lack the rational support required
by the due process clause because the evidence of character at the time of
the applicant's application was highly favorable. Id. at 239.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 241 (footnote omitted).
52. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880
1094 [Vol. 58:1087
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ple, in 1971 during the "May Day" antiwar demonstrations in
Washington, D.C., a total of 14,517 arrests were made.53 In Sullivan
v. Murphy5 4 a class action was brought on behalf of those arrested
during the week-long disorder,5 5 seeking relief for the abridgment
of their fourth amendment rights. In deciding whether relief was
appropriate, the court noted the importance of finding the exist-
ence of probable cause at the time of the arrests. Accordingly, it
explained that because of disorders in the District of Columbia fol-
lowing the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the normal
arrest practice of the police became unworkable.5 6 A new proce-
dure had been adopted whereby the officer would complete a
"Field Arrest Form" with relevant information, then turn the arres-
tee over to other personnel for booking and processing.5 7 This left
the arresting officers free to remain at the scene of the demonstra-
tion.
However, because of an anticipated increase in protest activity
the police chief decided that mass arrests were necessary and sus-
pended the field arrest procedures.5 8 Many innocent persons were
swept up in the process. 59 Because of the large number of arrests,
and the departure from normal procedure, it was impossible to de-
termine the validity of the arrests and detentions. Therefore, the
circuit court stated that the arrests were not entitled to the normal
inference of justification and held the arrests to be presumptively
(1973) (political demonstrators); Wilson v. Webster, 467 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir.
1972) (dictum); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (civil
rights workers); Bilick v. Dudley, 356 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (political
meeting); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated on
other grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971) (hippies); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881
(E.D. Pa. 1968) (same).
53. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 942 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880
(1973).
54. 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
55. The arrests were primarily for "disorderly conduct, violation of police lines,
unlawful assembly, and unlawful entry onto public property." Id. at 942.
56. The normal practice was for the arresting officer to escort the person arrested
on probable cause to the police station for booking and recording. However,
during the disorder the practice was unworkable because the police were
needed most on the street. Id. at 946.
57. Id.
58. The police chief's order came on May 3 and during that day 8,000 arrests were
made. The arrestees were loaded on vehicles and sent to detention centers.
Many were processed through a booking center composed of volunteers from
the Justice Department who had been told to record the arrestee's name, ad-
dress and physical description. They were to enter disorderly conduct as the
charge and could choose from seven police officers to list under "name of
arresting officer." Id. at 951. Photographs and fingerprints, normally taken to
assist in identification, were taken to be used by police during "Prep" ses-
sions before trial Id. at 969.
59. Id. at 949-50.
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invalid.60
Due to the unique circumstances of the case, the court con-
cluded that the inherent equity powers of a federal court allowed it
to grant relief to remedy the infringement of the plaintiffs' rights.61
Although the court left the decision of the precise relief to be
granted to the trial court, it did note that the order of relief should
limit:
maintenance and dissemination of the arrest records, and of all materials
obtained from persons taken into custody during the May Day protest, in
the absence of affirmative evidence produced by the Defendants to
demonstrate the existence of probable cause either at the time of the ar-
rest or subsequent thereto.
6 2
However, the court also indicated that placing the documents
under seal might be an adequate alternative to outright expunge-
ment, because it would protect the individuals' interests as well as
the government's. 63
Another incident of mass arrests resulted in Hughes v. Rizzo. 64
Certain young persons were apprehended during a series of ar-
rests made to rid a park of hippies. 65 The arrests were found to be
invalid and no charges were ever brought against the arrestees. 66
They subsequently brought suit seeking expungement of their
records. The court held that they were entitled to relief and di-
rected expungement of all arrest records and ordered the return or
destruction of photographs taken in connection with the arrests.6 7
Similarly, in United States v. McLeod,68 a series of arrests and
prosecutions of blacks had been made, apparently to keep them
from registering to vote through intimidation. The court granted
relief by directing that all fines be returned and court costs in-
curred be reimbursed and in addition ordered the expungement of
all arrests and prosecution records.69 It seems clear, therefore, as
the mass arrest cases demonstrate that
[a] n arrest without conviction is as much an indication of unlawful activ-
ity by the police as by the person arrested; yet, nothing appears on the
criminal record of the policeman for having committed an unlawful act.
When the policeman applies for credit or for a job, there is no notation of
law infraction.70
60. Id. at 970.
61. Id. at 971.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 973.
64. 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
65. Cf. Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969) vacated on other
grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971) (expungement ordered after finding that va-
grancy statute under which arrests of young persons at a "hippie house" had
been made was unconstitutional).
66. 282 F. Supp. at 885.
67. Id.
68. 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
69. Id. at 750.
70. Caine, supra note 2, at 1189.
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E. "Mistakes"
Equally reprehensible are a group of cases which can best be
classified as "mistakes," that is, situations of mistaken identity or
where the. individual was arrested and subsequent events un-
equivocally established innocence.7 ' Perhaps the most celebrated
case in this area is Menard v. Saxbe.72 A nineteen-year-old stu-
dent was sitting in a park late at night while waiting for a friend.
There had been a complaint of a prowler in the vicinity and so
Menard was approached by the Los Angeles police and question-
ed. Although he explained his reason for being in the park and his
friend later arrived confirming his story, he was arrested and held
for two days without a complaint being filed. Subsequently the po-
lice released him when they found no basis upon which to charge
him with a crime.73 However, his fingerprints and information con-
cerning the "arrest" were automatically forwarded to the FBI.
Menard brought an action to compel removal of his fingerprints
and record of arrest from FBI files.74 The district court denied re-
lief 75 but the court of appeals reversed,7 6 noting that Menard had
suffered more than mere personal distress. It recognized that
"[a]lthough Menard cannot point with mathematical certainty to
the exact consequences of his criminal file, we think it clear that he
has alleged a 'cognizable legal injury.' "77
The appellate court, however, did not order full expungement.
71. See, e.g., Irani v. District of Columbia, 272 A.2d 849 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971), ap-
peal from final order dismissed, 292 A.2d 804 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972) (innocent
bystander mistakenly arrested for parading without a permit); State v.
Pinkney, 33 Ohio Misc. 183, 290 N.E.2d 923 (Ct. C. P. 1972) (18 year old defend-
ant indicted for first degree murder released and charges dropped when
other persbns confessed to the crime).
72. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
73. It has been suggested that "in all probability the crime for which he was ap-
prehended had never taken place." Caine, supra note 2, at 1184 (citing
Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 492 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
74. The incident was the subject of much litigation, including two reversals and
remands by the circuit court. See Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir.
1970), on remand, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd sub nom., Menard v.
Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
75. 498 F.2d at 1019.
76. Id. at 1023.
77. Id. Accord, Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 868 (3d Cir. 1975), in which a high
school student was allowed to seek expungement of her FBI file. She became
the subject of an FBI investigation when she wrote a letter to an organization
on which the FBI had put a mail cover. Although the case did not involve a
criminal record the court noted that "[t] he threat that the file poses is analo-
gous to the dangers inherent in the maintenance of arrest ifies." Id.
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Instead it agreed with the contention that the decision to expunge
must be made at the local level and thus suggested that an action
should be brought against the local law enforcement agencies. The
court did order Menard's fingerprints and file transferred from the
FBI's criminal index to the identification index.78 It held that
when the Bureau is given notification of a change in the descrip-
tion of a record from, e.g., one of arrest to one of "detention only,"
the Bureau has a statutory responsibility to "expunge" the nota-
tion from its criminal identification files.7 9
Another case where subsequent events made it clear that the
arrestee was erroneously charged is United States v. Hudson.8o
Plaintiff was arrested for murder but after evidence disclosed that
the decedent had committed suicide, the charges against him were
dismissed. He therefore sought expungement of his records and
the court granted such relief.81 It was explained that entering a
notation of no conviction would not be an adequate remedy since
"[t Ihe existence of an arrest record, whether amplified or not, and
whether or not followed by a conviction, will subject the arrestee to
a host of disabilities .... *82 The court went on to rest its decision
on constitutional grounds:
[F] alure to expunge an innocent person's arrest record violates constitu-
tional protections, including the rights to privacy and due process. The
courts have a special obligation, within their area of jurisdiction, to call a
halt to the indiscriminate accumulation of information that threatens pri-
vacy and liberty.
8 3
It thus, seems difficult to deny that criminal records (both ar-
rest and conviction) are disseminated widely and relied upon to
the disadvantage of many former arrestees. The severe disabilities
attendant to the disclosure of these records are not limited to those
78. 498 F.2d at 1028.
79. Id. See also Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974) where the court
held that the FBI has a duty to prevent the dissemination of inaccurate arrest
and conviction records. The court based its opinion on 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1976)
which provides:
(a) The Attorney General shall
(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification, crimi-
nal identification, crime, and other records; and
(2) exchange these records with, and for the official use of, au-
thorized officials of the Federal Government, the States,
cities, and penal and other institutions.
(b) The exchange of records authorized by subsection (a) (2) of this
section is subject to cancellation if dissemination is made
outside the receiving departments or related agencies.
(c) The Attorney General may appoint officials to perform the func-
tions authorized by this section.
80. 16 Crim. L. Rep. 2468 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1975).
81. Id. at 2470.
82. Id. at 2468.
83. Id. at 2469.
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convicted of a criminal act. As the cases demonstrate, the poten-
tial for injury to the innocent individual is just as significant as it is
to the "ex-offender." 84 The pervasiveness of the problem has led
commentators to recommend sealing or expungement as neces-
sary and desirable solutions.85 However, the urgings have often
fallen on deaf ears as the courts have demonstrated reluctance to
utilize these remedies and the legislative response has been con-
fused and varied.86
I. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM: EXPUNGEMENT AND
RECORD SEALING
A. The Judicial Response-A Cautious Approach
When requested to order the return or destruction of criminal
records a majority of courts have been cautious in fashioning re-
lief.87 In the absence of express legislative authority, there has
been reluctance to grant expungement or sealing in any form.88
However, a number of courts, both state and federal, have in ap-
propriate cases ordered expungement or sealing. Where relief is
granted, several factors89 stand out as important: (1) there were
extraordinary circumstances such as an unconstitutional or illegal
arrest;90 (2) the facts convinced the court that "justice so re-
quired;"9' (3) innocence was unequivocally established; 92 and (4)
84. One federal court has described the problem graphically:
Any citizen, even one with an absolutely clean lifetime record of
not violating the law, through a series of circumstances could find
himself charged with a violation of the law even though he may be
entirely innocent of the charges. Our system of criminal justice will
in due course bring out the truth and he will be cleared. But his rec-
ord will not be cleared. And although he has been cleared under our
laws, at any future time the cloud of the prosecution against him will
remain to all who one way or another gain access to it: be it inquiries
concerning employment, security clearance, political office or investi-
gations concerning other criminal offenses.
United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75, 78-79 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
85. See note 9 supra.
86. See notes 154-82 & accompanying text infra.
87. This judicial reluctance indicates that there is inadequate protection against
the abuses of arrest record dissemination. In the case of conviction records
there is almost no hope for judicial relief. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zim-
merman, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 534, 258 A.2d 695 (1969) (order expunging convic-
tion record reversed, there being no statutory or common law basis for such
relief).
88. Some courts avoid deciding the merits of a petition for expungement on the
basis of jurisdictional defects. For an analysis of the issue, see Comment,
supra note 5, at 871-72 nn. 30-32.
89. See generally id. at 878-79.
90. E.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); Hughes v. Rizzo,
282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
91. Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
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in some cases relief was granted on a right of privacy theory.93
1. The Federal Courts
There is no specific federal statute providing for expungement
of criminal records. 94 However, the inherent equity power of a fed-
eral court has been recognized in a number of cases as authorizing
an order of expungement.95 For example, the petitioner in Kowall
v. United States9 6 had been convicted for failure to report for in-
duction into the armed services, but because his conviction was
subsequently reversed the court ordered that all records of the ar-
rest be expunged. In affirming the order of expungement the dis-
trict court noted that "the logic of the natural law of remedies does
not set arbitrary limits on a federal court's jurisdiction to right
wrongs cognizable by the common law within the jurisdiction of
the court."9 7 Having established its authority to grant expunge-
ment relief, the court adopted a balancing test 98 for determining
when such relief was warranted: "If it is found after careful analy-
sis that the public interest in retaining records of a specific arrest
is clearly outweighed by the dangers of unwarranted adverse con-
92. E.g., Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Hudson,
16 Crim. L. Rep. 2468 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1975); State v. Pinkney, 33 Ohio Misc.
183, 290 N.E.2d 923 (Ct. C.P. 1972).
93. See United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967); Davidson v. Dill,
180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211
(1971). As to the continuing validity of the privacy theory after Paul v. Davis,
see notes 139-53 & accompanying text infra.
94. Federal law does provide for the cancellation of a record. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 534(b) (1976); note 79 supra. But the provision is seldom invoked and has
been criticized as ineffective. Comment, Criminal Law--FBI Retention of
Criminal Identification Records-Tarlton v. Saxbe, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 151,
155-56 (1975).
95. E.g., Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880
(1973); Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
96. 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
97. Id. at 213.
98. "[T] he harm caused to an individual by the existence of any records must be
weighed against the utility to the Government of their maintenance." Paton
v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 868 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Chastain v. Kelley, 510
F.2d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (personnel file); United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925
(10th Cir. 1975); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Tarlton v.
Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). Some of the factors the courts consider in the balance are:
the accuracy and adverse nature of the information, the availability
and scope of dissemination of the records, the legality of the methods
by which the information was compiled, the existence of statutes au-
thorizing the compilation and maintenance, and prohibiting the de-
struction, of the recoreds [sic], and the values of the records to the
Government.
Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d at 869 (footnote omitted).
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sequences to the individual, then the records involved may prop-
erly be expunged."99 The government argued that the individual's
right of privacy was outweighed by the public's interest in main-
taining his criminal record. The court rejected the argument,
pointing out the tremendous burden a record could have on an in-
dividual's reputation and economic opportunities:
Even if no direct economic loss is involved, the injury to an individual's
reputation may be substantial. Economic losses themselves may be both
direct and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employment, or profes-
sional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent as a consequence of the
mere fact of an arrest, even if followed by acquittal or complete exonera-
tion of the charges involved. An arrest record may be used by the police in
determining whether subsequently to arrest the individual concerned, or
whether to exercise their discretion to bring formal charges against an in-
dividual already arrested.100
Similarly, in Sullivan v. Murphy'' a case involving large scale
arrests of anti-war demonstrators, the court stated that it pos-
sessed the authority to order the expungement of all records
where "necessary and appropriate in order to preserve basic legal
rights.' 02 Having established its authority to order expungement,
the court surprisingly left to the trial court the decision of what
specific relief should be granted. However, it noted that mainte-
nance and dissemination of the records should be limited since
"the very presence of these records carries the strong implication
that the underlying arrest and detention were somehow justi-
fied."' 0 3
Thus, under well-established common law principle, ° 4 it ap-
pears that a federal court has the inherent power to order ex-
pungement; but the power is not frequently exercised and whether
expungement will be ordered depends on the circumstances of
each case. There is "no definitive, all-purpose rule to govern re-
quests of this nature, and to a considerable degree each case must
stand on its own two feet.' 0 5
Sullivan, however, also illustrates a type of case which almost
always gives rise to an order of expungement-the mass arrest.
Although there are no hard-fast rules in this area it does appear
that in cases of large scale arrests of blacks, 06 hippies107 and anti-
99. 53 F.R.D. at 214.
100. Id. at 214-15 (footnotes omitted).
101. 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973). See notes 53-63 &
accompanying text supra.
102. 478 F.2d at 968.
103. Id. at 969 (footnote omitted).
104. See text accompanying note 102 supra. See also note 147 infra.
105. United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir. 1975).
106. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967). See notes 68-69 & accom-
panying text supra.
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war protestors'0 8 requests for expungement have been uniformly
granted. The rationale the courts have used has been varied.
Some seem to suggest that the circumstances were so extraordi-
nary that justice required an order of expungement. 109 Others rea-
son that the arrests were presumptively illegal-due to the large
number it was impossible to determine the validity of the arrests
and because of departure from normal procedure probable cause
was often established after the arrest. Therefore, expungement
would be granted unless the validity of the arrest could be demon-
strated by the government. 110 In any event, if an individual is the
victim of a mass arrest it would appear that his or her chances of
receiving expungement relief are quite good. However, the courts
seem to distinguish between arrests where members of a group
are harassed and cases involving a single arrestee. 11 1
In Menard v. Saxbe,1 12 for example, a student was erroneously
detained on suspicion of burglary. He was later released with no
charges filed against him but the incident had generated records
which Menard sought to have expunged. Initially the trial court
had granted summary judgment for the government but the court
of appeals reversed and remanded, stating that whether the
records could be maintained would depend upon a factual determi-
nation of whether there had been probable cause for the arrest." 3
On remand, the district court found that there had been sufficient
probable cause to justify the arrest and thus refused to expunge
Menard's records."14 Further, it questioned the utility of using a
probable cause test as a basis for granting expungement, stating
that such a determination "has little to do with the merits of the
underlying controversy."' 1 5 On appeal, however, the district court
107. Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated on other
grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
See notes 64-66 & accompanying text supra.
108. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
See notes 53-63 & accompanying text supra.
109. Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
110. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
111. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1472. The basis for the distinction might be
that it is easier to find that a group has been harassed than an individual. A
large scale arrest of hippies, for example, is more "extraordinary" than the
arrest of one hippie, even though in both situations the arrests might have
been for purposes of harrassment. Note also that in the mass arrest cases the
invalidity of the arrests was presumed, see note 60 & accompanying text
supra, but under the Menard test, see note 113 & accompanying text infra,
the court must find that the arrest was made without probable cause before it
can grant a request for expungement.
112. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See notes 72-79 & accompanying text supra.
113. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 492-95 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
114. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 723 (D.D.C. 1971).
115. Id. at 724. Two District of Columbia Court of Appeals cases have followed the
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was again reversed. Although not granting full expungement, the
circuit court did order a transfer of Menard's records from the
criminal to the neutral index and suggested Menard maintain an
action against the local agencies."16 Thus, after nine years of litiga-
tion Dale Menard was still left with a record"17 although it was no
longer considered "criminal." The case aptly demonstrates the re-
luctance of the courts to grant expungement relief to a single ar-
restee when alternatives such as restricting dissemination or
correcting inaccuracies are available."- 8
Two other federal courts have taken an even narrower position.
In United States v. Rosen"19 corporate and individual defendants
had been charged with numerous counts of unlawful importation
and receipt of Asiatic human hair wigs. All defendants were ac-
quitted in one of two indictments and charges against the individ-
ual defendants in the other indictment were dismissed. The court
denied defendant's motion for return of photographs, fingerprints
and arrest records, reaching this conclusion through "balancing
equities.' 20 It was explained that a "dismissal does not necessar-
ily go to a consideration of the merits"' 2' and in cases of acquittal
the records could be retained unless the arrest was illegal or a stat-
ute directed the return of the record. 22
A similarly restrictive view was taken in United States v.
Linn, 23 in which an attorney was acquitted of charges of mail
fraud and conspiracy. He sought expungement, alleging damage to
his professional reputation and an invasion of his right to privacy.
The court refused to order expungement and stated that relief
"should be reserved for the unusual or extreme case .... [A] n ac-
quittal, standing alone, is not in itself sufficient to warrant an ex-
punction of an arrest record."' 24
Thus, from the federal courts there emerges two basic tests for
Menard probable cause test but refused to order expungement or sealing of
the records. See District of Columbia v. Sophia, 306 A.2d 652, 654 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1973) and Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14, 19 (D. C. Ct. App.
1971) (proper remedy would be to order correction of the records and then
only if petitioner could show non-culpability and "not mere exoneration").
116. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
117. See Caine, supra note 2, at 1184-85 and n.18.
118. See also note 115 supra.
119. 343 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
120. The court found that society's interest in effective law enforcement out-
weighed the individual's right to privacy, especially since there had been no
allegation of harrassment, improper use of the records, or economic injury.
Id. at 808 (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 806.
122. Id. at 808.
123. 51aF.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1975).
124. Id. at 927-28.
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determining when expungement is appropriate: the probable
cause test and the balancing of equities test. The application of
these tests varies greatly. Some courts give great weight to the in-
dividual's interest in privacy, whereas others take a narrower view
that there must be extraordinary circumstances, i.e., an invasion of
privacy plus some other threatened injury.125 Similar diversity in
application of these tests has also appeared in several state courts.
2. State Courts
Of the state courts addressing the criminal record problem,
only a few have relied upon a right of privacy theory to grant ex-
pungement relief. In Davidson v. Dill1 26 the plaintiff, who had
been charged with loitering but was subsequently acquitted, re-
quested either the return or destruction of her records. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court balanced the individual's right to privacy
against society's interest in retaining records of acquitted defend-
ants, recognizing the potential personal and economic harm which
result from the dissemination of arrest records. In reversing the
dismissal of plaintiff's claim, the court made clear that plaintiff's
action did state a claim upon which relief could be granted: "The
complaint presents an extremely important issue ... involving a
constitutional right of the highest magnitude-an individual's right
to privacy vis-a-vis the propriety of the police retaining that per-
son's arrest records in police files after he had been acquitted of
criminal conduct."'127
Similar reasoning was utilized by the Washington Court of Ap-
peals in Eddy v. Moore128 where the rights involved were recog-
nized as fundamental.129 Petitioner requested the return of
photographs and fingerprints after charges of assault had been dis-
missed. The court agreed that disadvantages flow from criminal
records: one problem being an increase in police scrutiny.130 It
125. Comment, supra note 3, at 1476.
126. 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972). See also Note, Davidson v. Dill: A Compel-
ling State Interest in Retaining Arrest Records, 35 U. Prrr. L REV. 205 (1973).
127. 180 Colo. at 132, 503 P.2d at 162.
128. 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
129. See also State v. Pinkney, 33 Ohio Misc. 183, 184, 290 N.E.2d 923, 924 (Ct. C.P.
1972) ("there exists in the individual a fundamental right of privacy").
130. The court stated:
An individual who has been arrested and then acquitted has an
undeniable greater visibility to the police than other persons. His
fingerprints, and more particularly his photograph, are available to
be shown to other citizens as a potential suspect to be chosen in
prearrest lineups, an identification procedure frequently used by law
enforcement agencies. Increased police scrutiny resulting from an
arrest record and its potential invasion of the individual's private life,
if it occurs, should rest upon rational factors.
5 Wash. App. at 344, 487 P.2d at 216.
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was observed that once an arrestee has been acquitted of criminal
charges there remains no rational basis for the record to be re-
tained, especially in light of the fundamental principle that an ac-
cused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.131 The court held
that the fingerprints and photographs should be ordered returned
and stated:
We believe the right of an individual, absent a compelling showing of
necessity by the government, to the return of his fingerprints and photo-
graphs, upon an acquittal, is a fundamental right implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty and that it is as well within the penumbras of the specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights .... 13 2
However, a majority of courts have rejected the argument that
record expungement should be compelled under a privacy the-
ory.133 For example, in Loder v. Municipal Court,134 Loder at-
tacked a police officer who was beating his wife and was arrested
for battery, obstructing a police officer and disturbing the peace.
The complaint against Loder was dismissed and the officer was
temporarily suspended from duty for the incident. Loder sought
an order compelling the return or erasure of his arrest records.
The court reiterated an earlier position 135 that judicial intervention
was unwarranted and held that the trial court properly denied the
relief requested.136 It was noted that no statutory authority ex-
isted which would require erasure or return of arrest records. Fur-
ther the court recognized the multiple uses of such records
throughout the criminal justice system as constituting a substan-
131. For a discussion of the relationship between the presumption of innocence
and expungement, see Comment, supra note 35, at 668-70.
132. 5 Wash. App. at 345, 487 P.2d at 214 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484 (1965)).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1975); Herschel v. Dyra,
365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Seasholtz, 376 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D.
Okla. 1974); United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United
States v. Rosen, 343 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Beasley v. Glenn, 110 Ariz.
438, 520 P.2d 310 (1974); Walker v. Lamb, 254 A.2d 265, (Del. Ch.), affd per
curiam, 259 A.2d 663 (Del. 1969); Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14
(D.C. Ct. App. 1971); Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969);
People v. Lewerenz, 42 11. App. 2d 410, 192 N.E.2d 401 (1963); In re Raynor, 123
N.J. Super. 526, 303 A.2d 896 (1973); In re Foster, 72 Misc. 2d 1029, 340 N.Y.S.2d
758 (County Ct. 1973); Statman v. Kelley, 47 Misc. 2d 294, 262 N.Y.S.2d 799
(Sup. Ct.), affd. per curiam, 24 A.D.2d 936, 264 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1965); State v.
Bellar, 16 N.C. App. 339, 192 S.E.2d 86 (1972). See also Comment, Retention
and Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38 y. CHL L, REv.
850, 858-59 (1971).
134. 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976).
135. Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962). See
also note 14 supra.
136. 17 Cal. 3d at 876, 553 P.2d at 636, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
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tial governmental interest.137 When balanced against the individ-
ual right of privacy the court found the government's interest to be
weightier. 13 8
Additionally, the court cited Paul v. Davis139 for the proposition
that, "[t] here is apparently no right of privacy in arrest records
under the federal Constitution."' 40 In that case Davis brought an
action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act141 alleging depri-
vation of his constitutional rights. He had been arrested for shop-
lifting and his name and "mug shot" had appeared on a flyer of
"active shoplifters" which was distributed to approximately 800
merchants. Shortly after circulation of the flyer the shoplifting
charge was dismissed. Davis alleged that distribution of the flyer
caused injury to his reputation and therefore deprived him of lib-
erty and property without due process. He also alleged an inva-
sion of his right to privacy. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed
with the district court's dismissal for the reason that the alleged
facts did not establish deprivation of a constitutional right. The
Court held that any harm to Davis' reputation did not deprive him
of any "liberty" or "property" interest protected by the due proc-
ess clause. 142 As to Davis' privacy claim the Court declined to en-
large its prior "substantive privacy decisions"' 43 and thus
concluded that there had been no invasion of a constitutionally
recognized right.144
Paul v. Davis further complicates the question of what weight
the individual's right to privacy should be given in the balancing of
equities test. If the holding of the case is construed broadly then it
seems clear it could be relied upon to deny requests for expunge-
ment. However, one commentator has suggested that "Paul v. Da-
vis does not require a departure from cases permitting
expungement.' 45 The contention is that there are significant dif-
137. Id. at 864-68, 553 P.2d at 628-30, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 468-70.
138. Id. at 868-69, 553 P.2d at 630-31, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 470-71.
139. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
140. 17 Cal. 3d at 877 n.24, 553 P.2d at 637 n.24, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 477 n.24.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
142. 424 U.S. at 712.
143. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (guarantee of personal privacy limited
to matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception and family rela-
tionships).
144. 424 U.S. at 712-13.
145. Comment, supra note 3, at 1477 (emphasis in original). Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 735 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Court's holding might end the
notion of privacy as a basis for arrest record expungement):
A host of state and federal courts, relying on both privacy notions
and the presumption of innocence, have begun to develop a line of
cases holding that there are substantive limits on the power of the
Government to disseminate unresolved arrest records outside the
law enforcement system .... I fear that after today's decision,
[Vol. 58:1087
SEALING AND EXPUNGEMENT
ferences between Paul v. Davis and the expungement cases which
can serve as a basis for distinction. One difference is in the "na-
ture of the relief sought"'46-Davis sought both damages and in-
junctive relief, a remedy which could have been pursued through a
claim for defamation under state law.x4 7 A second difference and
"a more critical distinction... is the nature of the individual inter-
est in privacy asserted by Davis."' 48 Davis was seeking protection
from invasion of his privacy during a time when charges against
him had not yet been dismissed.149 Even those cases granting ex-
pungement under a privacy theory gave no recognition to the right
these nascent doctrines will never have the opportunity for full
growth and analysis. Since the Court of Appeals did not address re-
spondent's privacy claims, and since there has not been substantial
briefing or oral argument on that point, the Court's pronouncements
are certainly unnecessary. Of course, States that are most sensitive
than is this Court to the privacy and other interests of individuals
erroneously caught up in the criminal justice system are certainly
free to adopt or adhere to higher standards under state law.
Id. at n.18.
146. Comment, supra note 3, at 1477.
147. 424 U.S. at 697. Not only might there be a claim for defamation but also the
tort of invasion of privacy might be available. See generally Comment, supra
note 5, at 879-80 & nn.77-82.
There is a recurring tendency by the Court to avoid expanding section
1983 liability. See, e.g., Note, Section 1983: Liabilityfor Negligence, 58 NEB. L.
REv. 271 (1979). Thus, the underlying message of Paul v. Davis would seem
to be that claims like those of Mr. Davis should be pursued under state tort
law and not in the federal courts. Whether this means an end to equitable
expungement relief is not clear. See note 145 supra.
148. Comment, supra note 3, at 1477.
149. See United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967), in which the court
distinguished between the privacy rights of an individual before and after
exoneration and concluded that after an individual is exonerated, his or her
right to privacy is not outweighed by a legitimate governmental interest:
There can be no denying of the efficacy of fingerprint information,
photographs, and other means of identification in the apprehension
of criminals and fugitives. Law enforcement agencies must utilize all
scientific data in society's never-ending battle against lawlessness
and crime. When arrested, an accused does not have a constitutional
right of priacy that outweighs the necessity of protecting society and
the accumulation of this data, no matter how mistaken the arrest
may have been.
However, when an accused is acquitted of the crime or when he is
discharged without conviction, no public good is accomplished by the
retention of criminal identification records. On the other hand, a
great imposition is placed upon the citizen. His privacy and personal
dignity is invaded as long as the Justice Department retains "crimi-
nal" identification records, "criminal" arrest, fingerprints and a
rogue's gallery photograph. ...
. . h e preservation of these records constitutes an unwar-
ranted attack upon his character and reputation and.., violates his
dignity as a human being.
Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
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of privacy "prior to final dismissal of charges underlying an arrest,
and dissemination of arrest information in this pre-exoneration pe-
riod would not be precluded."'150
Thus, it does not appear that the right of privacy or interest in
reputation rise to a constitutionally-protected level so as to be
deemed fundamental rights as some of the earlier cases suggest.151
Yet the rationale of those cases need not be abandoned. In balanc-
ing the equities between an individual's interest in privacy and the
government's interest in retention, courts can still be sympathetic
to the hardships and disabilities attendant to a criminal record. A
distinction could be made between the privacy rights of an individ-
ual before and after exoneration 15 2 and Paul v. Davis can be lim-
ited to its particular facts. Although perhaps not entitled to the
weight of fundamental rights, the individual's interest in reputa-
tion and privacy can clearly outweigh any governmental interest in
retention of the records. 15 3
B. The Legislative Response
Although the courts have equitable power to order expunge-
ment, in a number of cases the view has been expressed that the
legislature was the proper body to make such a remedy avail-
able.M Thus, the criminal record problem has seen the attention
of Congress 155 as well as state legislative bodies.
150. Comment, supra note 3, at 1477 (emphasis in original).
151. See notes 126-32 & accompanying text supra.
152. "However, it is obvious that to recognize the privacy interest of all exoner-
ated defendants as being constitutionally protected would have dramatic
ramifications and pose serious problems in the context of existing law en-
forcement practices and record dissemination procedures." Comment supra
note 3, at 1493.
153. If fundamental rights are not involved, the government would not be required
to show a compelling state interest. But the courts could still use a balancing
approach or a rational basis test, finding in favor of the individual when no
legitimate state interest was at stake. See Comment, supra note 133, at 858-59
nn.48-49; text accompanying note 131 supra.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1973). But see
People v. Chapman, 62 Cal. App. 3d 251, 132 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1976) (implying
that legislative provision for destruction of arrest records might be unconsti-
tutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine).
155. See, e.g., I-1I 61/S. 1428 and ELR 62/S. 1427, S. 2008 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); H.R. 12574, H-R. 12575/S. 2963 and S. 4252 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974);
H.R. 10789, H.R. 10892 and S. 2964 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
See also Criminal Justice Data Banks-1974, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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1. Federal Remedies
There is no specific federal statute providing for expungement
of criminal records. However, there is a somewhat limited provi-
sion for record cancellation, which is seldom used and has been
criticized as inadequate.156 The major concern at the federal level
has been with preventing disclosure of FBI records which contain
inaccurate or incomplete information. Under federal regula-
tions,157 there are no limits on the dissemination of conviction
data' 58 and nonconviction data15 9 cannot be disseminated, with
certain exceptions. 160 Each state is free to make provisions in its
own best interests. 161 Although these regulations give the individ-
ual a limited amount of protection, they are inadequate in many
respects: 62 (1) they do not affect dissemination of the record to
law enforcement agencies or agencies of the federal government;
(2) they only reach records in the files of the FBI and do not di-
156. 28 U.S.C. § 534(b) (1976). See note 94 supra.
157. The regulations were issued by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion (LEAA) pursuant to a statutory amendment to its enabling legislation.
The amendment, which was enacted into law as section 524(b) of the Crime
Control Act of 1973, states:
All criminal history information collected, stored, or disseminated
through support under this title shall contain, to the maximum ex-
tent feasible, disposition as well as arrest data where arrest data is
included therein. The collection, storage, and dissemination of such
information shall take place under procedures reasonably designed
to insure that all such information is kept current therein; the Ad-
ministration shall assure that the security and privacy of all informa-
tion is adequately provided for and that information shall only be
used for law enforcement and criminal justice and other lawful pur-
poses. In addition, an individual who believes that criminal history
information concerning him contained in an automated system is in-
accurate, incomplete, or maintained in violation of this title, shall,
upon satisfactory verification of his identity, be entitled to review
such information and to obtain a copy of it for the purpose of chal-
lenge or correction.
Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub.L. No. 93-83, 87 Stat. 197 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3701-3795 (1970)).
158. But see the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
159. "Nonconviction data" means arrest information without disposi-
tion if an interval of one year has elapsed from the date of arrest and
no active prosecution of the charge is pending; or information dis-
closing that the police have elected not to refer a matter to a prosecu-
tor, or that a prosecutor has elected not to commence criminal
proceedings, or that proceedings have been indefinitely postponed,
as well as all acquittals and all dismissals.
28 C.F.R. § 20.3(k) (1977).
160. 41 Fed. Reg. 11,714 (1976) (revising 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(b)).
161. 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(c) (3) (1977).
162. "These provisions do not at the present time provide the national framework
necessary to limit dissemination of records." Madden & Lessin, Privacy: A
Case for Accurate and Complete Criminal History Records, 22 Vnz. L REV.
1191, 1197 (1977).
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rectly affect records made at the local level; and (3) they do not
provide for the return or destruction of the records. Therefore,
whether relief at the local level is available through state expunge-
ment or sealing laws becomes extremely important.
2. Remedies Provided by State Law
In response to the growing concern over the misuse and abuse
of arrest records several state legislatures have enacted protective
legislation usually in the form of prohibiting access to criminal jus-
tice information or requiring destruction of arrest records once the
arrestee has been exonerated. 63 Although the laws are in accord
as to purpose, a variety of approaches has been taken: some give
relief automatically, some provide for expungement, others allow
for sealing of records, and still others leave the decision to the dis-
cretion of the courts.
For example, in Missouri a person's arrest record must be
sealed to all persons except the arrestee if he or she is not charged
within thirty days of arrest.1 64 The statute also provides that if the
person is not convicted within one year after the records are
sealed, all records of the arrest must be expunged. 65 In the event
of a disposition other than conviction (nolle prosses, dismissals,
acquittals) the records pertaining to the case are to be sealed to all
persons except the arrestee. 66
Another state which provides for automatic relief is Connecti-
cut, whose law mandates that all court, police and prosecutorial
records be erased immediately once an arrestee has been acquit-
ted or discharged. 67 The records are sealed in locked ifies or de-
stroyed upon request. Notice of erasure is sent to any agency
known to have received the arrest information. 68
In other states the exonerated arrestee must petititon for relief.
For instance, in Maryland a person seeking expungement must
give notice to the law enforcement agency involved who then in-
163. For a survey of state laws, see Comment, Criminal Procedure: Expunging the
Arrest Record When There Is No Conviction, 28 OKLA. L REV. 377, 386-87
(1975); Comment, Epungement in California: Legislative Neglect and Judi-
cial Abuse of the Statutory Mitigation of Felony Convictions, 12 U.S.F. L. REV.
155, 172-78 (1977).
164. Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.100 (Supp. 1973).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 610.105.
167. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
168. The statute has been criticized as leaving "untouched and in place all of the
other information about the individual which has accumulated in the course
of a criminal proceeding." Weinstein, Confidentiality of Criminal Records
Privacy v. the Public Interest, 22 Vii. L. REV. 1205, 1210 (1977).
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vestigates the request.169 If the individual is denied relief he or
she may petition for a judicial hearing. Similarly, Nevada law al-
lows record sealing upon petition of the arrestee filed thirty days
after dismissal or acquittal. 170 There is a hearing on the issue fol-
lowing which the court may order the records sealed.
A different approach is taken in Arizona where a person
"wrongfully arrested" can seek a court order restricting dissemina-
tion of police and court records.171 The arrestee must petition the
court for relief and after a hearing on the petitition the court must
decide whether "justice will be served" by entry of a notation that
the person was arrested in error.172 If the court orders such entry,
no copies of the record may be released without a court order.
California presents yet another approach by having a "scat-
tered patchwork" of expungement statutes. One provision relieves
the disabilities attendant to certain felony convictions. 173 Another
provides relief to persons convicted of a misdemeanor and not
granted probation,174 whereas a second procedure is a sealing stat-
ute for minors. 7 5 Four provisions are aimed at relieving the effects
of conviction on narcotics users and juveniles, 176 and there is a pro-
vision for expungement of records of arrest or conviction for pos-
session or use of small amounts of marijuana.177 Record sealing is
provided upon acquittal and a finding by the judge that the defend-
ant was "factually innocent."'178
Under certain circumstances and passage of a substantial pe-
riod of time New Jersey law also provides for expungement of con-
viction records. 179 An innocent arrestee is afforded either the
remedy of expungement or sealing, but objection to a motion for
relief automatically precludes expungement 8 0
Yet there are other states, such as Nebraska, which afford no
real relief for the innocent arrestee and few states provide relief
for an ex-offender. In light of judicial reluctance to grant expunge-
169. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 736 (1976).
170. NEV. REv. STAT. § 179.255 (1973).
171. AnRz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4051 (Supp. 1978).
172. See Beasley v. Glenn, 110 Ariz. 438, 520 P.2d 310 (1974), in which the court held
that the statute did not provide for expungement but only a notation restrict-
ing dissemination.
173. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1979).
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4a (West Supp. 1979).
175. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45 (West Supp. 1979).
176. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 3200, 781, 1179, 1772 (West Supp. 1979).
177. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361.5 (West Supp. 1979).
178. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8 (West Supp. 1979).
179. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:169-11, 2A.164-28 (West 1971) (repealed 1978, effective
Sept. 1, 1979).
180. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:85-17, 2A.85-18 (West Supp. 1979-1980) (repealed 1978,
effective Sept. 1, 1979).
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ment unless there are "extraordinary circumstances," the absence
of protective legislation contributes to the burden on the victim of
a criminal record. As Aryeh Neier, Executive Director of the
American Civil Liberties Union has stated:
[A] rrest and conviction records often create social lepers who must exist
as best they can on the fringes of society. The dissemination of records
places a series of obstacles in the path of persons who wish to enter soci-
ety's mainstream and end the half-life of the world of crime. Is it any won-
der, then, that recidivism rates should be so high? How can we seriously
hope to reduce crime if we disseminate records which have the unin-
tended effect of making it impossible for people to stop being
criminals? 1 8 1
Thus, it is essential to take a closer look at what remedies most
adequately solve the problem. Given the overwhelming evidence
of the use and reliance upon criminal records182 it must be agreed
that a problem exists. The apparent disagreement among com-
mentators, the courts and legislative bodies has been over whether
the problem is so serious that it warrants legislative relief and if so
whether sealing and expungement are effective remedies.
IV. ARE EXPUNGEMENT AND RECORD SEALING
SATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS?
A. Shortcomings of Sealing and Expungement Statutes
It has been suggested that provisions for sealing or expunging
criminal records are a failure;183 that they are inadequate at re-
moving the disabilities that accompany criminal records 184 and
that they are of questionable constitutional validity.185 These and
a number of other arguments have been made to justify the reten-
tion of criminal records and denying expungement relief.
1. A System Which Purports to Destroy Records Does not
Work
Some commentators have argued that "expungement in the
sense of an erasure or destruction [is] impractical as well as inad-
visable."'81 6 They argue that once a record is created it is simply
not possible to expunge or seal it. This is the case primarily be-
cause statutes or court orders requiring expungement, generally
181. Hearings on S. 2008 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Sen-
ate Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1975) (statement of
Aryeh Neier, Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union).
182. See § II of text supra.
183. Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9.
184. Id. at 384.
185. Comment, supra note 3, at 1469-70.
186. Expungement from the General Public, supra note 9.
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do not reach all copies of the record which might have been dis-
seminated to various public agencies and private individuals.187
The problem seems to be that
in the absence of any penal sanctions against disclosure, the accessibility
of such records is generally a matter of whom one knows in the depart-
ment in which they are kept. Disclosure is further pyramided by the
many places to which such records are distributed and thus additional
sources from which they may be procured.
1 8 8
Specifically, it is argued that state expungement or sealing statutes
cannot affect FBI records and do not affect local police records. In
addition, legislation typically leaves room for employers to inquire
about an applicant's possible expunged or sealed record.189 Fi-
nally, "the written order for records to be sealed or destroyed is
itself not concealed; this, of course, creates a 'track' to be fol-
lowed."1 9 0 Because so many traces of a record may be left behind,
the contention is that expungement and sealing simply do not
work.191
Another argument which is frequently made is that history
should not be rewritten' 92 and that attempts to do so may lead to
"institutionalizing a lie.' 9 3 One court has stated that an arrest is a
"historical fact" and therefore
[n] o system of law can, with integrity, lend or appear to lend its aid to an
unreal denial of the events, particularly as such denials may affect the
lawful judgment of other persons who may in the future deal with them. It
is one thing to say that the system of law will legally ignore an acknowl-
edged fact and perhaps, pursuant to specific legislation, indulge in a fiction
that what was once a conviction or a criminal charge shall no longer be
187. Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9, at 384. 'That which is sealed may readily
become unsealed .... " Id.
188. Expungement from the General Public, supra note 9.
189. For example, an applicant might be asked whether he or she had ever had a
criminal record sealed, Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9, at 384, or whether he
or she had ever appeared as a moving party in any court, Gough, supra note
12, at 164-65 n.80.
190. Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9, at 384.
191. Id. at 383-84. "[K]nowledge of an expunged record is available if the prints
have been forwarded to the FBI .... [T] he person develops a false sense of
security and anonymity regarding the record that certainly does not maintain
in practice." Id. at 387.
192. The expungement, either by statute or judicial deccision, creates
new problems. It requires, in effect, that history be rewritten, that
events be turned into nonevents, and it attempts to achieve this
anomalous result by eliminating a part of the information which has
accumulated in the course of a criminal proceeding.
Weinstein, supra note 168, at 1210.
193. In encouraging him to lie, the society communicates to him that his
former offender status is too degrading to acknowledge, and that it is
best forgotten or repressed, as if it had never existed at all. Such
self-delusion and hypocrisy is the very model of mental ill health-
the reverse of everything correctional philosophy stands for.
Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9, at 385.
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deemed such; but it is quite another to assist in rewriting history at the
expense of truth, particularly where, as outlined above, the full truth if
effectively recorded can preserve the integrity of the individual as well as
the rule of law.
1 9 4
It has also been suggested that expungement and sealing proce-
dures are not available to all. The remedies are criticized as being
"functional only for a very small number of offenders who have
resources and can negotiate the system."' 95 Because granting re-
lief is generally within the discretion of the court it may be that
even if ex-offenders had knowledge of the remedy they would not
apply for it anyway.
2. Law Enforcement Would Be Hampered If Records Were
Not Retained
A good deal of opposition to the sealing or expungement of
criminal justice information has come from law enforcement au-
thorities. They cite the usefulness 196 of arrest records in solving
cases and in saving "valuable investigative time and energy.' u9 7
The retention of arrest records has also been justified by the po-
tential such records have for helping police prevent crimes.
One commentator suggests that identification information such
as fingerprints and photographs can be helpful to police "if the in-
dividual is ever under investigation again."' 98 The police are aided
by establishing positive identification or protecting a person who is
innocent. The information can also indicate a pattern of conduct
which could form the basis for a future arrest. Although it is ac-
knowledged that injury to innocent persons may result, "this risk
is outweighed in most cases by society's interest in the perform-
ance of these activities to protect the general public."' 99
3. Sealing and Expungement Laws Unconstitutionally
Infringe Upon Freedom of the Press
It has been suggested that the sealing of criminal records could
be framed as a clash between two constitutional rights-the right
to privacy and freedom of the press-and that in the balance the
194. Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14, 21 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (footnote
omitted).
195. Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9, at 386.
196. One commentator has termed this the "usefulness doctrine." See note 198
infra.
197. Criminal Justice Data Banks-1974, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consti-
tutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 199
(1974) (statement of Clarence M. Kelley, Director FBI declaring his opposi-
tion to sealing).
198. Comment, supra note 133, at 855. See also § II-A of text supra.
199. Id.
1114 [Vol. 58:1087
SEALING AND EXPUNGEMENT
right of privacy must yield.2 00 Relying on Paul v. Davis,20 1 COx
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,20 2 and Sheppard v. Maxwell,203 one
commentator contends that a state cannot make criminal history
records private or deny the press access to them.204
The right to gather news about judicial operations has only
been given limited constitutional protection, and thus "[t] he right
of access to classified, criminal justice records is as unclear as the
right to make them secret in the first place. '2 05 But "[w] hat tran-
spires in the courtroom... is public property" and to make pri-
vate the records of what transpired would prevent the press from
reporting on the administration of justice.20 6 Since the press has a
responsibility of scrutinizing the judicial process, "it would seem
that there is a corollary right of access to gather news about that
system."207
Although the Supreme Court did not give constitutional recog-
nition to the privacy right asserted in Paul v. Davis,20 8 it has gener-
ally avoided the question whether a state could make criminal
records private. It is maintained, however, that the Court's posi-
tion concerning state action which infringes first amendment
rights supports the argument that record sealing is unconstitu-
tional.209 When state action infringes upon first amendment rights
the state must show a compelling state interest in regulating the
subject, and that the objective could not be achieved by other
means. The argument is that the goal of sealing laws could be
achieved "without manipulating original source documents and
records traditionally open to public inspection .... -210 The com-
mentator suggests remedies which might be less drastic: "Statu-
200. Comment, supra note 7, at 522-26.
201. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
202. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
203. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
204. Comment, supra note 7, at 526-27. With regard to this argument one commen-
tator has noted:
The strongest advocates of open access are the news media.
While their interest is, in part, selfish-access to information, espe-
cially "inside" information, makes for good copy-they forcefully ar-
gue that elimination or concealment of information is an open
invitation to inadequate performance or illegal behavior. The press,
however, acknowledges few formal limits on its own access to pub-
licly held information. Self-restraint and enlightened self-interest
are considered to be sufficient constraints on journalistic abuse of
information.
Weinstein, supra note 168, at 1212-13.
205. Comment, supra note 6, at 522.
206. Id. at 527.
207. Id. at 521.
208. See notes 143-44 & accompanying text supra.
209. Comment, supra note 7, at 527-28 & nn. 119-20.
210. Id. at 528.
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tory requirements that records be accurate and complete, that
employers and others be forbidden to ask for or consider the indi-
vidual's non-conviction arrest record, and that the records them-
selves be open to correction by the individual .... -211
Thus, opponents of expungement say it creates new problems.
It requires that history be rewritten, it eliminates part of informa-
tion the accused may need as evidence of innocence, and it makes
difficult the responsibility of uncovering a potential pattern of cor-
ruption in our system of justice. The argument is that a system of
concealment does not work,2 12 and even if it did there exist alter-
native remedies which provide more adequate solutions to the
problem.
B. The Affirmative Side of Expungement and Sealing
Although sealing and expungement laws are not free from con-
ceptual and practical difficulties, they do confer benefits upon the
victim of a criminal record. The "collateral consequences ' 2 13 flow-
ing from a conviction as well as an arrest record mandate that a
remedy be provided. Leading organizations, 214 commentators 215
211. Id. at 529 (footnotes omitted).
212. It has been suggested that
it is also not entirely clear that most people want [sealing or ex-
pungement] to work. The thrust of the solutions is the sacrifice of
some purported public benefit to gain some purported private bene-
fit. If the private beneficiaries are actual or alleged criminals, and the
public beneficiaries are everyone else, then the perceived public ben-
efit is quite likely to prevail. The general public sees little or no con-
nection between collection and computerization of information about
"criminals" and its own "privacy" and related interests. The immedi-
ate problem of controlling criminal behavior precludes serious con-
sideration of remote and uncertain consequences. If the computer
can be used to "fight crime," then the public is behind it.
Weinstein, supra note 168, at 1211-12.
213. See generally Collateral Consequences, supra note 10.
214. See, e.g., the American Civil Liberties Union position discussed in Caine,
supra note 2, at 1188. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6 (1962) (providing lim-
ited relief for the removal of disabilities or disqualifications).
Rather than recommending expungement, the National Conference on
Uniform State Laws recommends that refusal to hire because of a conviction
record is an unfair employment practice except in situations which are nar-
rowly defined and directly related to the offense; for example, where the oc-
cupation would provide an opportunity to commit a similar crime. UNIFORM
LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF LAw ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAw ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE §§ 4-1001 to -1005 (1978).
See Perlman & Potuto, The Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing
and Corrections Act: An Overview, 58 NEB. L. REV. 925 (1979).
215. See generally note 9 supra.
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and several states 216 have recognized that the most effective rem-
edy is to provide for sealing or expungement of the record.
1. The System Can Work
It is by no means well-accepted nor does it necessarily follow
that expungement and sealing do not work simply because some
evidence of the record is not sealed or destroyed. One state re-
quires that notice be given any agency to which the arrest informa-
tion is known to have been disseminated.217 In the absence of
statutes in their jurisdictions, some courts have fashioned relief by
having the local police retrieve all disseminated copies of the rec-
ord and placed under seal, not to be opened nor their existence or
contents disclosed.218 Even if some information is "leaked" out,
statutes may prohibit inquiries into past arrests, 2 19 or allow the in-
dividual to deny the existence of the record with no threat of being
found guilty of giving a false statement.220 Thus, although it might
be desirable to have complete destruction of the record, the fact
that this is not possible in all cases does not negate the potential
relief which can be afforded.
A system which "sanctions deceit" may make some legislators
uncomfortable. A study of employer attitudes revealed that it
troubled them also:
Several expressed distrust of an expungement procedure, and indicated
that they would not look favorably on someone who had invoked it. As
one man put it: "We probably wouldn't fire the guy outright [i.e., in the
event of subsequent discovery of the offense], but I think we'd be rather
hurt that he didn't feel he could come and tell us about it.
' 22 1
But what is more bothersome is what happens to the exonerated
arrestee when he or she is totally candid with potential employers.
In Cissell v. Brostron,222 for example, charges against Cissell for
murder were dismissed. He made several attempts to secure em-
ployment and in one instance even supplemented the application
216. See § uI-B-2 supra.
217. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a (West Supp. 1979). See notes 167-68 and ac-
companying text supra.
218. See, e.g., Irani v. District of Columbia, 272 A.2d 849 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971), ap-
peal from final order dismissed, 292 A.2d 804 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
219. Similarly, inquiries into "old" convictions could be limited, i.e., whether there
had been any convictions within the last seven years. The government for-
merly asked for information concerning all arrests but now asks only for ar-
rests that led to a conviction. THE CHALLENGE OF CIME, supra note 4, at 75,
cited in Comment, supra note 37, at 132 n.63.
220. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.110 (Supp. 1973). See also Comment,
supra note 5, at 873 n.38; Comment, supra note 37, at 125.
221. Gough, supra note 12, at 154 n.39.
222. 395 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
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with a detective magazine story written about him which ex-
plained the details of his arrest. He received no response from that
employer. Following several more unsuccessful applications, he
sought and obtained an expungement order.223 On appeal the or-
der was reversed, the court holding that injunctive relief was avail-
able only in situations where actual injury could be shown and was
limited to restraining actual or threatened acts. 224 The "system,"
therefore, already sanctions deceit and perhaps even encourages
it.
Finally, the system is readily available to all ex-arrestees in
those states which provide for automatic sealing.225 Even in those
states where a petition is required the individual can be assured of
having as equal an access to the remedy as does any other individ-
ual.
2. Effective Law Enforcement Would Not Be Affected
It has been suggested that arrest or conviction records play a
vital role in effective law enforcement.2 26 Where the modus oper-
andi of a crime is sufficiently similar to that in a suspect's record
there might be probable cause for an arrest.227 Several factors are
important here: (1) a valid arrest is more likely if the actual crime
and the record of crime are not separated by too long a period of
time;22 (2) the reliance upon criminal records is justified if they
reflect a modus operandi similar to the activity in question; and (3)
the validity of the practice depends on the accuracy and complete-
ness of the records. 229
In the case of an exonerated arrestee there would appear to be
no rational basis for retaining the record.230 Indeed one court has
stated that there is no legitimate government interest in retaining
records of arrests not resulting in conviction: "Unresolved arrest
records generally may well have significance for law enforcement
purposes.... But charges resulting in acquittal clearly have no
223. Id. at 323-24.
224. Id. at 325-26.
225. See notes 164-68 & accompanying text supra.
226. See notes 196-99 & accompanying text supra.
227. W. LAFAVE, ARREST 288 (F. Remington ed. 1965). The author states: "The
difficult question is whether arrest can ever be proper when the primary ba-
sis for suspicion is the prior record of the suspect. A person's past record
does not in itself constitute reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has
been committed and that the person has committed it." Id. at 287. See also
note 20 supra.
228. See Gough, supra note 12, at 159.
229. See generally Comment, supra note 5, at 866.
230. Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 344, 487 P.2d 211, 216 (1971); see text accom-
panying note 131 supra; Comment, supra note 133, at 858-59 nn.48-49 (no legit-
imate state interest in retention of records of one mistakenly arrested).
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legitimate significance. Likewise, other charges which the govern-
ment fails or refuses to press or which it withdraws are entitled to
no greater legitimacy."231 Additionally, it has been estimated that
of the criminal histories received by state and local agencies, about
thirty-five percent do not contain dispositions.232 Indeed if the
records are not accurate and complete how can they be effective to
law enforcement agencies, when the only information they provide
is the mere fact of arrest? One suggestion is that "[e]ven if the
record is only one of arrest and not conviction, criminal justice
agencies as well as others tend to treat the two types of records as
equivalent."233
The factor of time would seem to favor the ex-offender. The
greater the period of time between his or her offense and a recent,
unsolved crime, the less valid would be an arrest based on the rec-
ord.234 In other words, once a period of several years has passed,
for example, five to seven, and the ex-offender has maintained a
"clean" record235 there is little likelihood of reasonable cause for
making an arrest based on a modus operandi of a crime "suffi-
ciently similar to that described in a suspect's record .... ",236
231. United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75,77 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (emphasis added).
232. See A. MILLER, THE AssAuLT ON PRIVACY 34 (1971) (35% of FBI "rap sheets"
contain no followup information); Madden & Lessin, supra note 162, at 1198
(citing The American Criminal History Record Present Status and Future Re-
quirements, Technical Report No. 14, SEARCH Group, Inc., Sacramento, Cal.
(1976)) ("In 1975 approximately sixty-eight million requests were made for
criminal histories by state and local level criminal justice agencies. Of the
criminal histories received 31% had missing data and 10%, it was estimated,
had erroneous information."); Comment, supra note 7, at 512 n.16 (citing
Criminal Justice Data Banks-1974: Hearings on S. 2542, S. 2810, S. 2963, and
S. 2964 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. Vol. I. at 37-38 (1974)) ("In several states, as
many as 70% of the records do not contain dispositions.").
233. Weinstein, supra note 168, at 1207.
234. See note 228 & accompanying text supra.
235. In New Jersey, "the statutes recognize that an old record loses its probative
value as indicia of a pattern demonstrative of criminal behavior." Comment,
supra note 5, at 888. Under the disorderly persons expungement statute the
individual must wait five years before seeking relief, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:169-
11 (West 1971) (repealed, 1978, effective Sept. 1, 1979), and under the criminal
expungement statute the waiting period is ten years, id. § 2A-164-28 (repealed
1978, effective Sept. 1, 1979).
Cf. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (5) (1976) (prohibiting
reporting of arrest or conviction information older than seven years); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1203.4a (West Supp. 1979) (to obtain relief, person convicted of
a misdemeanor must lead an honest and upright life, must not be charged
with the commission of any other crime, and must not have served a criminal
sentence for a one year period running from the date of conviction); OHio
REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32 (Page Supp. 1978) (first offender felons may petition
for expungement of the conviction record three years after final discharge).
236. Comment, supra note 5, at 866.
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All of these considerations have led one commentator to state:
Nor is there any proof that the pervasive recording and dissemination
of arrest records has any effect in fighting crime. In various hearings on
legislation on arrest records neither the FBI nor any other law enforce-
ment agency has presented a case that arrest records are essential in com-
bating crime. It is more likely that the wide dissemination of arrest
records has helped to create criminals, not the opposite.
23 7
3. Sealing and Expungement Do Not Infringe On Any
Constitutionally-Protected Rights
There do not appear to be any reported cases which have de-
cided the constitutionality of sealing or expungement laws.238 It
has been urged that a sealing law results in "a collision between
criminal record privacy and the people's right to know."239 But it
can be argued that sealing and expungement laws do not have the
effect of abridging first amendment protections primarily because
the press does not have an absolute right to gather news.240
The press has no greater access to information than does the
public.2A1 If a state denies access to certain criminal records by
sealing or expunging, the law applies to everyone, members of the
press and public alike. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,24 2 held
only that the state could not impose sanctions on the press for
publishing information obtainable from public records.243 It spe-
cifically left open the question whether a state could make such
records private:
If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the
States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other
exposure of private information. Their political institutions must weigh
the interests in privacy with the interests of the public to know and of the
press to publish. 2 4 4
237. Caine, supra note 2, at 1189-90.
238. But see Gannett Pac. Corp. v. State, Civil No. 42343 (Hawaii 1st Cir. Ct., June
20, 1974), cited in Comment, supra note 7, at 517 n.39 (preliminary injunction
issued against enforcement of Hawaii law that sealed all information con-
cerning an arrest from the moment of the arrest).
239. Comment, supra note 7, at 517.
240. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
241. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
242. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
243. Id. at 496. "Cox makes clear the difference between trying to prevent the
press from gathering the information in the first place, and trying to prevent
the publication of something that has been learned-especially from a public
record." M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAw 384 n.8
(1977).
244. 420 U.S. at 496. "We mean to imply nothing about any constitutional ques-
tions which might arise from a state policy not allowing access by the public
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The state cannot tell the press what to publish or what not to
publish.245 Thus, the fact of the arrest can be reported by the news
media.24 6 But once the charges have been dismissed and the indi-
vidual exonerated, the records may be closed or destroyed and
therefore access to them denied. The press' right to publish is sim-
ply not directly affected by such a practice.
Since there is no infringement of the freedom of the press the
state is not required to show a compelling state interest but rather
a rational basis between the regulation and the legitimate objec-
tive it seeks to achieve. Still, critics of expungement and sealing
laws assert there are less drastic alternatives which would provide
more adequate relief.247 Those that have been suggested are: (1)
requiring complete and accurate records;246 (2) prohibiting inquiry
about non-conviction arrest records;249 (3) making the records
more available to insure accuracy 25° and (4) changing social atti-
tudes through education and supporting legislation.251 However, it
is not at all clear that these alternatives are satisfactory. Granted,
part of the problem is the dissemination of inaccurate and incom-
plete records. Nevertheless, even assuming this problem could be
cured by requiring accuracy, expungement or sealing laws would
still be needed. An accurate arrest record creates the same prob-
lem as an inaccurate one; there is a tendency to equate an arrest
with a conviction. Accuracy does not cure the "undoubted 'social
stigma' involved in an arrest record."25 2
VI. CONCLUSION
The problems inherent in the vast dissemination of criminal
records cannot be ignored. The overwhelming impact these
records have on prospects of employment and schooling as well as
the use to which they are put by law enforcement agencies demon-
strates the need for some sort of protection of the individual
against abuse and misuse. Because the equitable expungement
and press to various kinds of official records, such as records of juvenile-court
proceedings." Id. at n.26.
245. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
400 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
246. The right to publish such information would be protected by the first amend-
ment and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). See also Ten-
nessean Newspaper, Inc. v. Levi, 403 F. Supp. 1318 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
247. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 529.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9, at 388.
251. Id.
252. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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relief by the courts has been scarce, it is to state legislatures that
individuals look for relief.
The legislative response has been haphazard in those states
where expungement or sealing laws have been enacted. Other
states, such as Nebraska, have consistently refused to enact pro-
tective legislation of any kind. It is suggested that, at a minimum,
relief for a person "wrongfully arrested" or "factually innocent" is
imperative. Additionally, due to the presumption of innocence
there is no legitimate reason for retaining records of other exoner-
ated arrestees. As to conviction records, lines can be drawn, for
example, on the basis of the seriousness of the crime. In any
event, legislation is needed to avoid the "social stigma" in criminal
records-some type of provision for relief is long overdue.
Linda S. Buethe '79
